"Understanding Deflation: Treating the Disease, Not the Symptoms" by Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall Wray
Working Paper No.  392
Understanding  Deflation:
 Treating the Disease, Not the Symptoms
By
L. Randall Wray
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
and
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by
Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to
disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals.
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit,
nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service.
Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy
responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in
the United States and abroad.




Copyright © The Levy Economics Institute 2003 All rights reserved. 
1
  In recent months, many policy makers and analysts have fretted about the possibility that 
the U.S. economy might enter a protracted period of price deflation. Price data have been 
scoured for evidence, but are not yet conclusive. Federal Reserve officials have tried to calm 
markets by asserting they have at hand a number of tools to fight deflation. Those who consider 
deflation a real threat point to Japan, while naysayers argue that our economy is different, and 
our policy makers are more astute. Some time ago, Chairman Greenspan added to the confusion 
by eliminating the ￿D￿ word from his public pronouncements, trying to reassure markets that 
economic recovery is imminent and hinting that the real threat is renewed inflation.
1 This threw 
bond markets for a loop on the fear that the Fed is poised to raise interest rates at the first 
unambiguous signs of decent growth. As a result, longer term interest rates, which had been 
trending toward all-time lows on expectations the Fed would keep short term rates low, rose 
sharply. Ironically, some observers￿including, apparently, Chairman Greenspan take rising 
interest rates as evidence against the prospects for deflation!   
What we find missing from most analyses on this topic is a clear discussion of the causes 
of the deflationary pressures that seem to afflict economies today on a global scale. Further, 
most discussions and analyses do not identify the costs that might be associated with deflation, 
but rather appear to presume that deflation is itself a bad thing. In what follows, we will argue 
that deflation can and usually does generate large economic and social costs, but it is more 
important to understand that deflation itself is a symptom of severe and chronic economic 
problems. This distinction becomes important for the design and implementation of economic 
policy. For example, if deflation is the primary problem, then one might propose policies 
specifically designed to stop prices from falling. If however deflation serves mostly as the 
canary in the coalmine, policy should be aimed at the underlying economic problems that 
generate deflationary pressures rather than at the falling general price level, per se. We note that 
one can make such a distinction between the design of the early New Deal policies that were 
mostly devoted to maintaining prices and wages versus the later New Deal policies that tried to 
resolve problems of unemployment and deficiency of demand that were largely responsible for 
deflationary pressures. In our view, those who believe that the Fed can effectively battle 
deflationary pressures with its monetary tools (and even using fairly unconventional tools many 
                                                         
1 In a speech on December 19, 2002, Greenspan focused on deflation, warning that it could be more damaging than 
inflation. (Andrews 2002) On May 21, 2003 he warned that ￿deflation is a possibility.￿ (Leonhardt 2003) Fed 
officials publicly stated that even if the fed funds rate fell to zero, they could still stimulate growth by buying long-
term bonds. Greenspan￿s statement as well as the possibility that the Fed might buy long-term bonds fueled a 
speculative boom that pushed long-term rates down. However, Greenspan reversed course in his July 2003 
testimony, when he stopped talking about deflation and presented an optimistic forecast of economic growth. 
Further, he surprised the bond market by saying it was unlikely that the Fed would buy longer-term bonds. Long-
term rates immediately reversed course. (Firestone and Fuerbringer 2003) Recently Greenspan has tried to justify 
his earlier concerns about deflation, arguing that while the possibility was exceedingly remote, the costs of 
deflation are sufficiently large to warrant Fed concerns.  
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commentators urge the Fed to ￿pump liquidity￿ into the economy to prop up prices) have not 
identified the causes of deflation nor have they formulated policy to resolve the economic 
problems generating deflationary pressures. At best, they are merely treating symptoms, not the 
underlying disease. 
 
CAUSES OF DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES 
 
The current situation in the U.S. must be examined in the context of the policy stance (both 
monetary and fiscal) of the past decade. Ten years ago the economy was trying to recover from 
a ￿double-dip￿ recession, with slow growth and almost no job creation. Many blamed the Fed 
for its ￿too little, too late￿ easing of monetary policy. Even when growth did pick up in the 
middle of the decade, the Fed still fretted about inflation, with many analysts advocating a 
policy of ￿speed limits￿ according to which the Fed would tighten if economic growth exceeded 
the 2.5% that was believed to indicate ￿full employment￿ potential (corresponding with a 
presumed NAIRU of some six or six and a half percent). (Bell and Wray 1998) However, the 
Greenspan-helmed Fed eventually came to the view that the speed limits of the past no longer 
applied to the ￿New Economy.￿ For a variety of reasons, economic growth picked-up, 
unemployment hovered around 4%, and while the Chairman and other Fed Governors 
continually warned that inflation lurked just around the corner, the Fed maintained relatively 
low rates. Nearing the end of the decade, the Fed could take it no longer and raised the fed funds 
rate in a series of a dozen steps. In quick succession, the stock market collapsed, the New 
Economy crashed and burned, the official recession hit, and the Fed began to lower interest rates 
in another dozen-plus steps. For almost three years now Chairman Greenspan and most pundits 
have been predicting recovery, even as job losses escalate, as bankruptcies by individuals and 
firms accumulate, as sales stagnate, and as wages and prices are pressured. 
  Such a story, which emphasizes the important role played by the Fed over the past 
decade, could be told by Fed detractors and supporters alike. One could see in that story brilliant 
management by Chairman Greenspan, who engineered the longest expansion in U.S. history, 
wiped-out inflation, and skillfully brought the economy out of an induced soft-landing designed 
to purge excesses resulting from over-full employment. Alternatively, one could argue that the 
Chairman blundered into, and contributed to, the worst speculative bubble in world history and 
then raised rates to fight non-existent inflationary pressures only to throw the economy into a 
dangerous deflationary spiral. That latter interpretation is now taking hold in markets, as 
evidenced by a cascade of editorials questioning the earlier canonization of Chairman 
Greenspan. (Morgenson 2003, Krugman 2003)  
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But that is at best half the story. The other half begins a bit earlier, with the efforts by 
Congress to mandate balanced federal government budgets during the 1980s, culminating in the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1986. This ￿fiscal responsibility￿ played a large role in 
throwing the economy into the Bush (I) recession of the early 1990s, and relative fiscal restraint 
contributed to the difficult, jobless, recovery. Eventually, however, the burgeoning budget 
deficit overcame the headwinds induced by a deficiency of aggregate demand coming from the 
private sector. The economy began to grow. For a number of reasons (some of which were 
analyzed in Wray 2000, Papadimitriou and Wray 2001a), including what Greenspan labeled 
￿irrational exuberance,￿ the stock market ￿wealth effect,￿ the ￿New Economy￿ hype, creative 
accounting, President Clinton￿s contagious libertinism, and innovations in consumer credit, 
firms and consumers began to borrow and spend on an entirely unprecedented scale. This not 
only overcame the fiscal drag built into the budget by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings mandate, 
but actually generated large and rising fiscal surpluses that were projected to continue through 
the end of the first quarter of the new century. As many analyses published by The Levy 
Economics Institute proclaimed at the time (Godley 1999, 2003; Godley and Izurieta 2001; 
Godley and Wray 1999; Papadimitriou and Wray 1998, 2001a, 2001b) the expansion was highly 
unsustainable and faced an almost inevitable and ugly crash. To be specific, the end would come 
when households and firms taken collectively tried to bring their spending back into line with 
their incomes. Given the structural fiscal stance (which is biased to run a balanced budget or 
even surpluses at modest rates of economic growth) as well as the structural external negative 
balance (at any probable growth rate, the U.S. will run a trade deficit that dampens demand), 
moderate growth requires that the private sector run deficits. (Godley 1999, 2000; Godley and 
Izurieta, 2001; Papadimitriou et al 2002) Traditionally, however, private sector deficits had been 
rare and short-lived before 1996; indeed, the typical private sector balance had been a surplus of 
some two or three percent of GDP (except during robust booms). Hence, if the private sector 
were to return to a more normal budget surplus, the demand deficiency that would be opened 
would generate massive lay-offs as firms would try to bring production down to match falling 
demand. As this occurred, it would raise the number of unemployed by millions, creating 
snowballing financial difficulties as households lost jobs and incomes and as firms faced falling 
sales revenue. Further, tax revenues would fall precisely when all levels of governments needed 
to increase spending to deal with rising needs. (See Wray 2003) This means that those projected 
surpluses would not and could not be realized, indeed, very large government deficits would be 
restored. For states, rising deficits would create intolerable budget situations and hence lead to 
draconian spending cuts and tax increases. 
And so it all came to pass￿or, at least, it is currently underway. In our view, recovery is 
not right around the corner. At best, the economy might limp along with a ￿growth recession,￿  
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although a ￿double-dip￿ recession is possible. In either case, job losses will continue to occur 
because the economy will grow too slowly to halt the hemorrhaging labor market. There is even 
the possibility that things could get very much worse, if a full-scale deflation were to take hold. 
Let us turn to a worst case scenario after first examining what we mean by deflation. 
 
DEFLATION: Definitions, Consequences, and Policies to Counter It  
 
Deflation can be defined as a falling general, or overall, price level. Many analysts refer to one 
of the common price indices￿the consumer price index, the GDP deflator, or perhaps one of 
the somewhat narrower indices like the wholesale price index or an index of manufactured 
goods prices. However, this definition leads to some ambiguity and raises many questions. All 
price indices are constructed and reflect assumptions about weighting schemes, and indeed 
which prices to include, as ￿baskets￿ of purchased goods and services change through time. The 
most general indices (the CPI and GDP deflator) include many ￿imputed￿ prices of goods and 
services that are not regularly sold in markets. Measuring prices through time (which is essential 
to determining whether prices are falling) leads to well-known heterogeneity problems 
(including product quality assessments). Further, even ￿market prices￿ are quite complexly 
determined and usually administered or at least influenced by firms with market power as well 
as by government policy.  
What this means is that it is not clear that deflation is￿by itself￿always and 
everywhere a problem. This is for several reasons. First, while unlikely, it is certainly possible 
to record a falling index (i.e., the CPI) even if no firm actually experiences falling prices 
received for the sales of its products. This could happen, for example, if technological advance 
led to improved quality of all (or a significant portion of) output produced at constant costs. 
Quality adjusted prices calculated for the index would then fall even though actual sales prices 
(hence, revenues and incomes) remained constant. The index could also fall if imputed prices of 
services not bought in markets (such as the value of imputed services from owner-occupied 
housing) fell. Or, even more simply, tax cuts could lower production costs and lead to falling 
prices. In none of these cases would firms or consumers necessarily see the measured 
￿deflation￿ as a problem. Indeed, a vibrant and innovative market economy would expect to see 
such price changes frequently and on a large enough scale to affect overall price indices 
(sometimes pushing them up, other times pushing them down), but such changes should not 
worry policymakers and thus should not lead to policy responses. 
As our late colleague Hyman Minsky emphasized, prices serve many functions in a 
modern economy. Prices allow firms to cover costs and to accumulate financial reserves to 
internally finance investment. All things equal, each individual firm prefers to sell at a higher  
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price rather than a lower price. However, falling prices of output for a firm, industry, or even a 
sector can be consistent with long-term strategic plans. During the New Economy boom, for 
example, prices of high tech products were generally falling￿for a wide variety of reasons, 
some of which are well-known. First, there is the normal ￿product cycle￿ in which new products 
first sell at high prices to upper income households and then sales gradually filter down to lower 
income households as prices fall (VCRs and cellular phones are good examples). This product 
cycle pricing is captured to a greater or lesser degree in the price indices, depending on the 
product and the index. Second, rapid technological advance especially in the manufacturing of 
computers and peripherals led to rapidly falling production costs, while competition forced retail 
prices down (quality-adjusted prices fell at an even faster pace). Third, manufacturing of high 
tech products moved to low cost foreign producers, as did many of the services associated with 
the sector￿lowering costs and helping to push down prices. Hence, falling sales prices were not 
necessarily inconsistent with healthy performance by firms (effects on consumers were also 
good, although displaced workers suffered). Further, much of the New Economy￿s high tech 
boom was financed through the frenzy of the stock market￿s excesses and not through debt 
issues; as discussed in more detail below, the level of debt plays an important role in 
determining whether a firm can cope with falling output prices. To be sure, the high tech sector 
is a rather small part of the nation￿s output, and a small part of the consumer￿s basket, although 
advances in this sector also tended to reduce production costs in other sectors. While the New 
Economy innovations probably could not have generated deflation as measured by conventional 
indices, one can conceive of the possibility that innovations affecting larger sectors of the 
economy might be capable of generating benign measured deflation on an economy-wide scale. 
But, this is not the kind of deflation that should worry policy-makers.  
While few analysts have been specific, most seem to be concerned about the possibility 
of a 1930s-style deflation. Irving Fisher called this a ￿debt deflation￿ and Hyman Minsky was 
fond of pointing out that while output prices fell by ￿only￿ 25% during the Great Depression, 
asset prices fell by 85%. That is, unlike most current commentators, both Fisher and Minsky 
emphasized falling asset prices￿most prominently of equities and farms in the case of the 
1930s￿not falling indices of output prices. This is not to imply that the two price systems are 
unrelated. In Minsky￿s view, competitive pressures and inadequate demand due in large part to 
declining investment spending as well as inappropriate fiscal policy led to falling sales and 
output prices. This in turn led to lay-offs and pressure to cut wages. Falling wages, however, 
depressed demand further and led to a vicious cycle of price cuts, declining wages, and falling 
employment and sales. That was bad enough. But because the 1920s had been marked by a run-
up of private sector debt (the first consumer debt explosion occurred in the 1920s as households 
financed purchases of the new electronic products made available; farmers had borrowed  
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heavily to finance land purchases; and the finance of investment by firms had changed markedly 
with the rise of what Rudolf Hilferding called ￿finance capitalism￿ to rely on greater external 
finance), and because debts are in nominal terms, falling sales prices and wages made it 
impossible to service the debt. Defaults snowballed and brought down the banking system, 
wiping out the savings of depositors. Minsky liked to say that the financial system became 
￿simplified￿ as most of the financial assets and liabilities disappeared. The lasting effects were 
fear of indebtedness, and hence financial conservatism, as well as destruction of banker-
borrower relations that impeded recovery and contributed to the decade-long depression (made 
worse, as discussed below, by errant fiscal constraint). 
Note that several of the early New Deal programs were designed specifically to halt the 
fall of product prices and wages. One could see these programs as based on the belief that the 
main problem was the falling prices and wages, themselves. These programs were largely 
unsuccessful￿in addition to constitutional problems, market pressures induced firms to 
circumvent the programs in order to cut wages and prices anyway (although some of them 
remained in place for decades after the depression ended, in the form of agricultural price 
supports and commodities buffer stock programs, and they did help to maintain some price 
stability in the postwar economy). One could see these as attempts to treat the symptoms (wage 
and price declines) rather than the underlying disease (insufficient demand). Many of the later 
New Deal programs were designed to restore demand: direct employment programs (WPA, 
CCC) and creation of various income support programs (the biggest was Social Security). It is 
our belief that these proved to be much more successful precisely because they were aimed at 
the disease, not the symptom of falling prices. 
Unfortunately, those New Deal programs that were designed to prop-up aggregate 
demand were overcome by attempts to balance the budget in 1936. Indeed, as the federal budget 
moved toward balance the economy slumped back into depression in 1937 (by some measures, 
the drop of economic performance in 1937 was more precipitous than the original decline at the 
beginning of the 1930s). As the economy unraveled, tax revenue plummeted and spending on 
social programs began to grow. The budget moved toward a growing deficit, helping to move 
the economy toward a weak recovery. Of course, the most important boost to demand came with 
the start of WWII, and continued in what is somewhat inaccurately called post-war ￿military 
Keynesianism.￿ The Great Depression came to an end, and the Keynesian ￿golden age￿ began. 
Minsky￿s trenchant analysis identified the difference between pre-war ￿small 
government capitalism￿ and post-war ￿big government capitalism.￿ When the size of the federal 
government rose from 3% of the nation￿s output to some 20 to 25% of output it became able to 
provide a very large countercyclical force because when private demand fell (most importantly, 
investment spending), the government￿s deficit would increase (largely automatically as tax  
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revenues linked to economic performance would fall even as income support spending would 
rise) and provide a needed boost to demand. More importantly, according to Minsky (1992), the 
rising deficit would prop-up corporate profits (as demonstrated in what is called the Levy-
Kalecki profits equation
2) and thereby help firms to meet their contracted payment 
commitments. In this way, falling private demand would not necessarily generate snowballing 
defaults on debts and culminate in a Minsky-Fisher debt deflation. In Minsky￿s view, this, 
together with intervention by the Fed as a lender of last resort to prevent bank runs, is what 
banished great depressions and debt deflations from the U.S. economy for the last six decades. 
The question is whether the post-war arrangements and financial structures have evolved to the 
point that ￿it￿ can happen again￿a question we will address in the next section. 
There is a third approach to dealing with price deflation, but it was never seriously 
considered until the 1970s with the rise of Monetarism. It is now the most commonly discussed. 
The central bank is supposed to be able to stop deflation by ￿pumping liquidity￿ into the 
economy. This of course follows on from the famous claim by Friedman and Schwartz that the 
Great Depression was caused by foolish Fed policy. When the Fed reduced the money supply, 
prices collapsed and generated widespread bankruptcy. The solution? Increase the rate of 
growth of the money supply. Commentators have not been specific, but there is a commonly 
held belief that Fed ￿control of the monetary pump￿ is the answer to deflation. Let us examine 
this possibility in a bit more detail.  
Friedman once joked that we can analyze central bank injections of money into the 
economy by assuming that helicopters simply drop it from the sky. In the real world, no central 
bank would even consider such a policy. Rather, real world central banks either engage in open 
market purchases of sovereign debt, or lend reserves at the discount window.
3 It is very 
important to understand that central banks buy debt or lend at the discount window in order to 
provide banking system reserves.
4 In recent years, most analysts have come to recognize that 
provision of reserves is nondiscretionary from the point of view of the central bank; that is to 
say, reserves are provided only when the banking system is short of reserves. The reason is 
rather simple. When banks are short of reserves, they go to the overnight, interbank, market for 
reserves (called the fed funds market in the U.S.) to borrow the reserves they need. If the 
banking system as a whole is short of reserves, the ￿bids￿ to borrow exceed the ￿offers￿ to lend, 
placing upward pressure on the fed funds rate. All central banks operate with an overnight rate 
                                                         
2 In its simplest form, this approach demonstrates that profits are identically equal to investment, plus the 
government￿s deficit, less the current account deficit, plus consumption out of profits, and less saving out of wages. 
3 Depending on institutional arrangements, some central banks might also buy privately-issued debt; this is really 
not that much different from lending at the discount window against private debt that is deemed acceptable as 
collateral. 
4 Conversely, central bank open market sales, or net reductions of outstanding discounts, drain reserves from the 
banking system.  
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target, and when the market rate is bid above the target rate band, the central bank intervenes to 
provide reserves. The only choice the central bank has is whether to lend the reserves at the 
discount window, or to provide them through open market purchases. In the past, the Fed has 
experimented with borrowed reserve and with nonborrowed reserve targets, but total reserves 
(the sum of the two) cannot be set discretionarily by the Fed (the Fed found that if it constrained 
growth of one of these components, the other simply grew faster).  
However, in recent months, some commentators have asserted that even if the fed funds 
rate target gets close to zero, the Fed will still be able to provide stimulus by ￿pumping 
liquidity￿ into the economy. (See Bernanke 2002 for the more-or-less definitive statement.) 
Some have said this will be accomplished by buying longer-term government bonds, or even by 
purchasing privately-issued debt. However, once the banking system has all the reserves it 
wishes to hold, further purchases by the Fed will simply generate excess reserve positions. This 
will place downward pressure on the fed funds rate, ultimately driving it to zero. Once a zero 
fed funds rate is reached, additional purchases by the Fed will simply cause a substitution on 
bank balance sheets of non-earning reserves for bonds. The end result will not be that the money 
supply has increased, but rather that banks will hold more (excess) reserves but fewer bonds. In 
addition, the fed funds rate will be stuck at zero, and it is probable that interest rates on longer 
maturity bonds will also be reduced.
5 Indeed, the Fed can achieve a zero fed funds rate any time 
it likes simply by leaving some excess reserves in the banking system (this is how the Bank of 
Japan keeps its overnight rate at zero). It is possible that moving to a zero fed funds rate target 
could add some stimulus to the economy (Japan￿s experience to date should cause one to doubt 
the strength of such medicine), but once a zero rate is reached, monetary policy becomes 
impotent.
6 It is really not helpful to imagine helicopter drops, nor to talk of ￿pumping liquidity￿ 
into the economy￿all that will really result is a zero fed funds rate target. 
In a recent interview, Milton Friedman admitted that evidence accumulating over the 
past several decades has thoroughly discredited the two main Monetarist beliefs he once held: 
First that the central bank can and should hit monetary targets and second that the money supply 
is reliably related to prices. (London, 2003) While we are not sure what his views are 
concerning this current discussion about ￿pumping liquidity￿ into the banking system to fight 
inflation, we are certain that such pronouncements are not helpful to policy formation. 
 
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO: A Debt Deflation 
 
                                                         
5 Indeed, ￿operation twist￿ of the early 1960s tried to lower longer-term interest rates as the Fed sold short-term 
bonds and bought long-term bonds. 
6 In fact, maintaining or increasing bank holdings of undesired, excess, reserves could backfire by reducing bank 
profits (since reserves do not earn interest).  
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Hyman Minsky warned that a small government economy with complex financial relations 
would be subject to periodic episodes of debt deflation. We have already examined the role that 
big government can play in helping to stabilize demand. (Papadimitriou and Wray 2001a, 
2001b) It is necessary to briefly explain why financial arrangements matter. Minsky emphasized 
that the new stage of capitalism developed in the early 20
th century included increased reliance 
on external finance of investment spending. According to Minsky, as the 20
th century 
progressed, a ￿layering￿ of finance developed, with ever-larger portions of positions in assets 
financed by borrowing. Ironically, the existence of big government and the absence of 
depressions and debt deflations in the post-war economy actually encouraged ￿balance sheet 
adventuring￿ through increased leverage (or borrowing). Indeed, any historical debt series 
shows that private debt ratios (whether measured as debt-to-income or debt-to-net worth) have 
trended upward in the post-war period. Some periods, especially the 1980s and 1990s, show 
sharp accelerations of such trends. Minsky attributed the 1980s ￿explosive￿ growth of debt 
leveraging to financial innovations, and in particular to increased use of leveraged buy-outs (in 
which prospective income flows of the take-over target were pledged against the loans used in 
the buy-out). Of course, many of these LBOs eventually led to bankruptcies because the debts 
ultimately could not be serviced. But Minsky would argue that even though individual defaults 
occurred, and even though financial crises sometimes resulted (as in the case of the Savings and 
Loan crisis of the 1980s), no general debt deflation was generated￿in spite of the fact that 
increasingly severe recessions did hit the U.S. economy. This can be attributed to the 
combination of ￿big government￿ deficits that put a floor to aggregate demand, and to quick 
intervention by the ￿big bank￿ Fed as necessary to stop financial crises from spreading. 
However, Minsky also worried that absence of a debt deflation encouraged increasingly 
fragile financial positions￿and, as just mentioned, debt ratios have indeed climbed steadily. 
Could ￿it￿ (debt deflation) happen again? Yes, Minsky thought, it might. Let us quickly review 
developments that might have made that worst case scenario more possible. 
First, the federal government has been ￿down-sized￿￿partly due to devolution of more 
responsibilities to state governments, partly due to reduced military spending, and partly due to 
the attempts to balance the budget (already discussed above). By the end of the 1990s, federal 
government spending had declined to just over 17% of GDP￿a fall of some three percentage 
points below what was common in the postwar period. And, importantly, tax revenues had not 
fallen much￿they were still running about 20% of GDP, in spite of the much-vaunted tax 
cutting efforts of President Reagan a decade earlier. What this meant is that a demand gap of 
nearly three percentage points had opened up. To be sure, slower economic growth since then 
has eliminated the budget surplus and generated a large deficit. However the point remains that 
the government budget has been structured to run surpluses at moderate rates of growth so as to  
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act as a drain on demand (called ￿fiscal drag￿ in the early 1960s)￿and this exerts a chronic 
drain on disposable incomes and profits, making it harder to service debt that was emitted in 
each expansion. 
This has been made worse by another development over the past two decades￿the 
chronic and growing trade deficit. This deficit now runs some 5% of GDP. When we add 
together the tendency to run budget surpluses and the trade deficit, we have a ￿leakage￿ of 
aggregate demand that reaches to 6% or 7% of GDP when the economy grows robustly. This 
leakage must be made up by a private sector ￿injection,￿ that is, through spending in excess of 
income by households and firms taken as a whole. It is thus no coincidence that the Clinton 
boom was characterized by a private sector (business and personal sector) deficit that reached 
above 6% of GDP. There are two further considerations related to private sector deficits. First, 
firms in the U.S. have become more exposed to prices of imports produced in low-cost 
developing nations. This has made it more difficult to maintain prices of final output, hence, has 
made debt service more precarious. And, second, private sector deficit spending has meant 
acceleration of growth of private indebtedness. Hence, exactly at the time that firms have 
greater difficulty in holding prices steady to ensure they can service their debt, their 
indebtedness has risen. 
The Clinton expansion was unusual not only for the extent of borrowing by firms, but 
also because consumers were borrowing heavily to allow them to deficit spend. Mirroring the 
effect on firms, competition from low-wage nations has also imperiled ability of households to 
service their rising indebtedness out of wage income. As production shifts off-shore, or as it is 
simply reduced due to low demand, more households find their incomes reduced and begin to 
experience difficulty making payments on debts run-up over the course of the expansion. While 
the pace of personal borrowing has subsided a bit in recent months, it is no secret that 
consumers have carried the economy since 2000, largely by borrowing against home equity. As 
late as the first half of 2003, household debt was still growing at 10 percent per year￿and 
household debt now stands at 83.5% of national income, up from 76% in 2000. (Crooks 2003) 
The aftermath of the bursting of Wall Street￿s bubble is also important. Many 
households lost financial wealth as equity values plummeted, creating some financial distress 
and leading to some moderation of consumption. What is only now being realized, however, is 
the long-term damage that has been done to the private pension system. About 44 million 
private sector workers and retirees are covered by defined benefit plans, which typically hold 
portfolios biased toward equities holdings. The three-year bear market has already forced some 
of these defined benefit plans into default, and estimates place the remaining plans some $400 
billion short. (Walsh 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) Unless Congress approves relief, companies will 
have to contribute $125 billion next year, and because there is a long lag built into the system,  
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even if the summer equity price rally continues firms will have to continue to make such 
contributions for several years to come.
 7  The dilemma is that forcing firms to set aside more 
cash for their pension plans will force them to cut elsewhere￿adding to the deflationary 
pressures. Alternatively, some firms will use bankruptcy or mergers to eliminate defined benefit 
plans￿which increases the burden on retirees. If equity markets do not recover and begin to 
post moderate gains, and if the economy does not begin to grow more rapidly to generate 
household income and corporate profits, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC the 
government agency that guarantees pensions) could, according to Treasury Secretary John W. 
Snow, face a ￿financial meltdown similar to the savings-and-loan collapse of 1989.￿ (Walsh 
2003a) 
In recent months, concerns have also arisen about the quasi-governmental home 
mortgage guarantors, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae￿technically government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) that are widely believed to have the ￿full faith and credit￿ of the U.S. 
government behind them. Together, they own or guarantee 42% of the U.S. mortgage market. 
Freddie Mac is accused of mis-stating earnings and has recently ousted four of its top managers. 
It has been reported (Bloomberg 2003) that the European Central Bank is selling-off its 
portfolio of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae securities, and has advised its twelve member central 
banks to do the same. The yield spread between securities issued by these agencies and U.S. 
Treasury debt has widened on worries about credit risk. More generally, it has become apparent 
that U.S. real estate markets may be approaching a peak and mortgage rates appear to have 
reached bottom and started upward. If real estate markets cool and some regions begin to 
experience falling values, the entire mortgage-backed securities market could be in trouble.  
Ultimately, it is probable that the federal government would bail-out the PBGC, Freddie 
Mac, and any other GSE that threatened to fail. The question is at what point would the 
government step in, and what conditions would it impose on the agencies it rescued. When the 
savings and loans failed, the Bush (senior) administration￿s rescue plan was formulated and 
executed in such a way that asset prices were depressed by ￿fire-sales￿ of thrift assets by the 
Resolution Trust Corporation. As it turned out, this did not generate a general asset price 
deflation because the long 1990s expansion together with the post-1987 stock market bubble 
allowed asset prices and financial institution balance sheets to recover. It is at this point 
impossible to know how the current Bush (junior) administration would react to a possible crisis 
involving the PBGC or any GSE. It should be remembered that most of the thrift industry￿s 
excesses came after the Reagan recession, when they were encouraged to grow fast to try to 
                                                         
7 Congress is considering a new law that would temporarily relieve firms of their obligation to contribute more 
money to pension programs that are underfunded. At one point, discussion became so heated that Democrats 
stomped out of a session of the House Ways and Means Committee, and the panel￿s chairman called the Capitol 
police.  
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restore profitability. Indeed, the final collapse came in the middle of a long expansion that had 
been fueled by large government deficits (rather than solely by private borrowing). By contrast, 
our current situation comes at the end of the second of two very long expansions (Reagan￿s and 
Clinton￿s) and very rapid growth of private sector debt for more than a decade and a half.  In 
Minsky￿s terminology, today￿s economy (taken as a whole) is much more fragile than it was 
during the S&L crisis. 
The final point we would make here concerns the financial position of state budgets￿
which is the worst since the Great Depression. This has recently received a great deal of press, 
especially because of the situation in California￿the governor of which faces a recall in part 
because of its budget problems. The state already cut $12 billion from its spending and plans to 
cut at least another $8 billion for this year. (Uchitelle 2003) Even that will not be enough, so the 
state has been forced to engage in creative accounting￿for example, by selling the state￿s right 
to collect tobacco settlement money￿and borrowing. Bond rating agencies have lowered the 
state￿s debt to near junk bond status, and the interest rate spread on California general obligation 
bonds over Thomson Financial Triple-A interest rates is now twice as large as it was during the 
recession of the early 1990s, or the Orange County financial crisis of 1994-5. (Fuerbringer 
2003a) While California￿s situation is arguably the worst, states have been forced to cut between 
$20 and $40 billion, and some have raised taxes as well. All but two states are required by their 
constitutions or statutes to balance budgets, but what this means in practice is that they only 
need to attempt to submit balanced budgets for the coming year. Hence, there is a great 
incentive to overestimate revenue and to underestimate expenditures. It is likely that very large 
deficits will open-up over the coming year as tax revenue continues to fall far short of 
projections. State income tax revenues are closely tied to federal income taxes, which are falling 
sharply and show no signs of recovery (for the first nine months of the current fiscal year, 
federal individual income tax receipts were down $39 billion, and corporate income taxes were 
down $18 billion compared to the same period last year; since 2000, federal tax receipts have 
fallen by $269 billion￿the first time revenues have fallen for three straight years since the 
Great Depression). (Weisman 2003) Unlike the federal government, state and local governments 
can be (and occasionally are) forced to default on their debts. Even if they do not, budget 
cutting, lay-offs, and tax increases will begin to take a greater toll on the economy this year for 
the simple reason that states had already made all the least painful adjustments during the past 
three years. The financial situation of states has already been proclaimed to be the worst since 
the Great Depression. But if our prognosis is correct, things are likely to get very much worse 
before they get better. 
 
CONCLUSION: Likely Prospects and Effective Policy Responses  
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Falling indices of output prices￿what most commentators seem to worry about￿can be 
generated by several mechanisms: productivity increases, quality increases and hedonic 
imputations of prices, competition from low cost producers, or depressed aggregate demand. 
These causes are not equally pernicious. Falling output prices, in turn, can have deleterious 
effects especially on the ability to service debts fixed in nominal terms, but that burden depends 
of course on the indebtedness of households and firms.  
We believe that the probability of significant deflation of output prices￿even as 
imperfectly measured by conventional indices￿is not great even with increased foreign 
competition, productivity increases, and falling aggregate demand. Nor do we believe that 
falling output prices, alone, would be sufficient to wreak havoc on the economy. Rather, the real 
danger comes from the possibility of a deflation of asset prices. These can fall much faster and 
farther than can prices of output￿although we do acknowledge that falling output prices can be 
a contributing cause of falling asset prices. Stock prices are already down significantly from the 
year 2000 pre-recession peak, and the recent Levy Economics Institute study by Arestis and 
Karakitsos (2003) makes a strong case that a double-dip recession could cause them to fall by as 
much as another 25%. Real estate prices also appear to be excessive compared with long-term 
trends, a result of recent low mortgage rates and, perhaps, lack of alternative assets with high 
prospective returns. Given the rising leverage ratios that have become increasingly accepted by 
financial markets, the margins of safety have been reduced considerably over the past two 
decades. What this means is that fairly small negative movements of the value of real estate (and 
other) assets can reduce the value of assets below the debt issued in their purchase. (Indeed, the 
effects of a real estate market crash would be more wide-spread across American households 
than were the effects of the stock market tumble after 2000.) In a worst-case scenario, this 
would lead to ￿fire sales￿ of assets, pushing their prices down farther and setting off a classic 
Minsky-Fisher debt deflation spiral. 
One might view the consequences of a debt deflation as rather benign, because, after all, 
the physical assets (the homes, the office buildings, the plant and equipment) remain even as the 
debt is wiped-out. Minsky called this a process of financial ￿simplification￿￿it allows the 
economy to emerge from a deep recession (or depression) with little debt. However, experience 
shows that the impacts on expectations and confidence are so devastating that recovery can take 
a decade or more (see the discussion of Japan below). Meantime, the suffering of the 
unemployed is intolerable for any democratic nation. 
Is there an alternative? After WWII, Evsey Domar (1944) remarked that the best 
solution to heavy indebtedness is economic growth￿not debt deflation. But not just any type of 
growth will alleviate over-indebtedness of the private sector. It was, after all, the relatively  
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robust and private-sector-led growth during the Clinton expansion, as well as the sluggish 
recovery since 2000, that led to the current high debt loads. In 1963 Minsky argued that not all 
expansions have the same impact on private sector balance sheets; in particular, an expansion 
led by the domestic private sector must, all things equal, increase private sector indebtedness. 
More recently, Godley (1999, 2003) has carefully constructed for The Levy Economics Institute 
a three sector model￿domestic private sector, public sector, and foreign sector￿that allows us 
to relate the balance sheets of each to spending flows. Put concisely, if our economy tends to run 
a current account deficit then the government sector must run a deficit of equal size (relative to 
GDP) to permit the domestic private sector to run a financial balance (income equal to 
expenditures). In the case of the U.S., given our trade deficit of 5 percent of GDP, the 
government deficit must also be equal to 5 percent of GDP to allow our private sector to spend 
an amount just equal to its income. If the government deficit is smaller, the private sector must 
deficit spend, meaning its outstanding debt will grow. Now, the relations among these variables 
might be quite complex, and it could be the case that smaller government deficits generate 
smaller trade deficits through complicated feedback effects. But Minsky￿s point remains that in 
the case of the U.S., trying to rely on private sector spending to fuel an expansion in the context 
of ￿fiscal prudence￿ that attempts to achieve government budget surpluses, will tend to increase 
private sector indebtedness and generate the kind of financial fragility that makes a debt 
deflation possible.  
The U.S. federal government budget has already relaxed by some 7% of GDP, moving 
toward a deficit that might reach 5% of GDP before the end of this year. This has gone a long 
way toward allowing the private sector to bring its spending into line with its income. However, 
when the economy has been sluggish in the past, the private sector has typically retrenched its 
spending much more, such that it spends significantly less than its income. On average, except 
when the economy grows robustly, the private sector runs a surplus (spending less than its 
income) equal to some 2-3% of GDP (in downturns that surplus can sometimes run twice as 
high). If the current account deficit remains in the 4-5% range, the government sector as a whole 
(federal, state, local) would have to run a deficit of 7-8% of GDP to allow such a large private 
sector surplus. (Papadimitriou et al 2002) As discussed above, state budgets are currently in 
deficit and are likely to remain in deficit for some time to come. However, states are prevented 
from running planned deficits￿by their own statutes and by markets. Hence state (and local 
government) budget deficits lead to discretionary spending cuts and tax increases. So long as 
state budgets remain in trouble, states will be ￿downsizing￿ and acting as a drain on the 
economy. Only the federal government can run sustained and discretionary deficits that will 
allow the private sector to firm-up its balance sheets.  
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One possible scenario is that the economy will stagnate as private sector spending falls, 
lowering demand and income, and, thus, tax revenues. Federal government spending would not 
fall (at least, not as quickly), so the budget deficit will continue to expand until it reaches the 7-
8% of GDP that is necessary to allow the private sector to run a 3% surplus. The large federal 
deficit would then maintain aggregate demand at a level such that GDP growth remained 
slightly positive; private sector balance sheets would improve very slowly as spending less than 
income would allow households and firms to gradually pay-down some debt. Barring large 
defaults (say, by mortgage lenders or pension funds) that might snowball, the overall financial 
position would eventually improve to the point that private spending would begin to grow. Net 
job creation would resume, and the economy would finally enjoy an expansion. We can label 
this the ￿muddling through￿ scenario. The question, of course, is how long this process could 
take.  
For an example, we might look to the case of Japan. While it is too early to tell, it 
appears that Japan is finally beginning to emerge from recession, after some 14 years with little 
growth. The national government￿s budget deficit has hovered in the range of 7% to almost 9% 
of GDP for several years, and appears to have finally overcome the headwinds created by 
private sector retrenchment. Unlike the U.S., Japan runs large current account surpluses that 
allow larger private sector surpluses. However, the Japanese household is famously more 
￿thrifty￿ than the typical American consumer￿which means that the sum of the current account 
surplus and government budget deficit must be very large in Japan to allow the private sector to 
achieve its desired surplus of income over spending. We believe there are cultural differences as 
well as economic differences (such as a better social safety net in the U.S.) that make it likely 
that the turn-around in the U.S. will be quicker than that of Japan. Still, a Japanese-like 
stagnation could take hold in the U.S. for an extended period of time before a federal budget 
deficit of 7-8% of GDP would allow improvements in the confidence of the private sector. As 
private sector indebtedness was worked-off, the private sector would also accumulate federal 
government bonds (an 8% federal deficit today would add over $800 billion of safe government 
debt to the economy annually). After several years of deficits in this range, some trillions of 
government debt would be added to private sector portfolios, going a long way toward replacing 
wealth lost in the stock market downturn as well as the (probable?) coming real estate downturn. 
That appears to be exactly the process that is turning around the Japanese economy. 
A more favorable scenario might be achieved with a quicker, discretionary, federal 
government stimulus package. A broad-based tax cut could boost household incomes allowing 
improvement of balance sheets without requiring curtailment of consumption. Capital gains tax 
cuts, cuts of taxes on dividends, or even across-the-board income tax cuts are not the best way to 
do this, for the simple reason that these will not put much money into the hands of most  
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Americans. Most readers are well-aware that capital gains and dividends are concentrated in the 
hands of the highest income households, but they might be surprised to hear that income tax cuts 
won￿t help most Americans very much. But this is simply because most Americans pay little to 
nothing in the way of federal income taxes. (In 1998, the top 13% of all taxpayers paid almost 
70% of all federal income tax; the bottom three-quarters of income earners paid only 17% of all 
federal income taxes. Wray and Tcherneva 2001) A far better way to help most Americans is to 
cut payroll taxes￿some estimates show that 80% of all taxpayers pay more in payroll taxes than 
in income taxes. We do not want to revisit the debate about Social Security￿s finances here, but 
to allay concerns that this will ￿gut￿ the program, we suggest a refundable tax credit equal to 
50% of (OASDI) payroll taxes paid by workers (this would represent a tax credit of about $110 
billion in 2003), to be deducted from ￿general revenues￿ and not from Social Security￿s 
revenues. This could be made temporary, to be phased out as the economy recovers. We would 
also favor a permanent tax credit to employers equal to 50% of their (OASDI) payroll taxes 
paid. This would not only reduce costs but would also encourage employment and make 
American labor more competitive with foreign labor. Together, these provisions would add 
some $220 billion annually to the economy, and would increase the federal deficit (all else 
equal) by a bit over 2% of GDP. This would leave some room for increased emergency federal 
government spending. We advocate increasing the federal government￿s emergency provisions 
to states in order to halt pressures on them to slash budgets. An additional $100 billion to be 
allocated to states would allow them to eliminate budget shortfalls and to deal with increased 
needs until the economy turns around. 
Much of this stimulus will be phased-out as the economy recovers. In our view, the 
federal government￿s ￿structural￿ or full employment budget is far too tight, and even with 
increased military spending for the war on terror (that will continue for the foreseeable future) 
and with the various tax cuts already enacted, some ￿permanent￿ relaxation will be required. In 
addition to the payroll tax credit for employers discussed above, we would advocate increased 
federal government support for public infrastructure investment, in the range of 1% of GDP 
annually. Perhaps most of this could be devolved to state and local government, with the federal 
government providing funding of projects that met approved standards. (Spending could be 
postponed in an economic boom if inflationary pressures threaten.) There is overwhelming 
evidence that spending on public infrastructure has been inadequate for more than three 
decades. (The recent evidence of the crippling electricity blackout clearly points to the 
immediate need to rebuild the country￿s energy system, while annual reports show the state of 
disrepair of our nation￿s bridges.) At least some studies suggest that such spending has a 
beneficial impact on private investment, in addition to the obvious benefits that accrue from the 
infrastructure itself.  
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In conclusion, to the extent there is evidence of output price deflation, or, at least, of 
deflationary pressures, we view this mostly as a symptom of an underlying disease. That disease 
is inadequate demand. The causes of the disease are surely multifarious: overindebted 
households and firms, competition by low cost producers overseas (at least some of this coming 
from American firms that have relocated), serious demand problems outside the U.S. (again, for 
a wide variety of reasons), state and local government budget problems, and excessive 
investment and saturation in some sectors of the economy (notably, the high tech sector). To 
that list, we would add￿and single out as perhaps the most important contributing factor￿the 
excessively tight federal government budget that had its beginnings in the balanced budget 
initiatives at the end of the 1980s. Fortunately, this factor is (economically) the easiest to 
remedy. By contrast, there are no easy solutions to most of the other factors depressing demand.  
But the federal government budget can be shifted to a more fiscally neutral stance through 
broad-based tax cuts and new spending programs. The barriers are political, not economic. This 
does not mean that we discount the size of the shift of thinking within the Beltway that will be 
required￿particularly by Democrats who now want to seize on the growing deficit as a 
campaign issue with which to do battle with the administration. However, if views of the proper 
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